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Credit default swaps: 
what are the social beneﬁ  ts and costs?
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are derivative contracts that allow agents to shift the risk of default on an 
underlying credit from a credit protection buyer to a credit protection seller. Like other derivatives they are 
standardised relative to the underlying cash markets and in this way can help promote market liquidity. 
This in turn can facilitate risk shifting and price discovery. In this way they may lead to accurate pricing of 
credit risk and ultimately to the reduced costs of borrowing. However, like other derivatives it is possible that 
CDS contracts could play a part in market manipulations, especially when the underlying cash market is 
not transparent. This is a potential cost of CDS trading that should be weighed against potential beneﬁ  ts of 
liquidity, risk shifting and price discovery. We discuss the balance of these trade-offs in the context of single-
name corporate CDSs, index CDSs, sovereign CDSs and CDSs on structured credit product tranches. We 
also discuss other potential costs of CDS trading including that they “make selling short too cheap” and 
that they may create market instability by facilitating speculative attacks. 
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1| VILLAIN OR SCAPEGOAT?
Since their introduction in the early 1990’s the 
market for credit default swaps (CDSs) grew 
exponentially through 2007 after which it underwent 
a consolidation, declining by about 35% according to 
some measures of activity. The fact that the growth 
of this market and its subsequent decline seemed to 
coincide with the boom and then bust of the credit 
market generally has not gone unnoticed. On the 
contrary. There have been many strident voices 
arguing that CDSs have been part and parcel of the 
excesses on ﬁ  nancial markets, that they contributed 
directly to the severity of the crisis, and that bringing 
CDSs under strict regulatory control or possibly 
banning them altogether is a necessary step to 
avoiding crises in the future. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
development of default swaps within the broader 
literature on similar ﬁ  nancial instruments and to 
assess their social beneﬁ  ts and costs. Our framework 
admits the possibility that beneﬁ  ts may exceed the 
cost as well has the possibility that they do not. 
We try to identify characteristics that could tip the 
balance either one way or the other. We then discuss 
those characteristics within the speciﬁ  c contexts of 
four major categories of CDS contracts – single name 
corporate CDS, index corporate CDS, sovereign CDS 
and CDS written on tranches of structured credit 
products. Finally we discuss whether the CDS market 
might serve a useful purpose as a very direct input 
into future macro prudential regulations. 
2| CDSS ARE DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS
While CDSs differ from futures, forwards and 
options in some respects they are nevertheless 
derivative contracts and share many of the same 
characteristics as those derivative contracts which 
have long been an integral part of our modern 
ﬁ  nancial system. In particular, the potential social 
beneﬁ  ts of risk sharing and price discovery that a 
well-designed and well-functioning futures or option 
market can provide, apply as well to the CDSs. The 
private costs of derivatives are the tangible costs of 
developing, operating and regulating a derivatives 
market that are reﬂ  ected in direct and indirect 
(e.g., bid/ask spread) costs of transacting incurred 
by participants. More controversially, various 
social costs beyond these private costs have been 
ascribed to derivatives markets from time to time. 
These include possible manipulations or possibly 
discouraging real investment by increasing the 
volatility of the underlying cash market. 
The CDS market is still relatively young and very 
little research has been done speciﬁ  cally assessing 
the costs and beneﬁ  ts in this market. In contrast, 
there is a large literature on the costs and beneﬁ  ts 
of futures and options. The public assessment of the 
balance of costs and beneﬁ  ts is implicitly reﬂ  ected 
in the range of regulations that have been applied 
to these markets both through self-regulation by 
industry participants and by public authorities. 
Since early days of the development of organised 
derivatives markets they have been viewed with 
suspicion. Nevertheless, they have proved to serve 
legitimate commercial purposes so that all but the 
most die-hard critics have recognised that they may 
be beneﬁ  cial when used by qualiﬁ  ed practitioners.1 
Defenders of derivatives markets point out that these 
markets serve the purposes of allowing risk shifting 
and price discovery. What are the social beneﬁ  ts 
of risk shifting and price discovery?2 If derivative 
contracts allow an agent such as a producer to 
hedge the risk of cash market price ﬂ  uctuations 
this may reduce the risk premium that the produce 
will apply in making investment decisions. This 
in turn will encourage production and will lower 
costs to consumers of the associated end products. 
Price discovery operates by giving an incentive 
to agents to become better forecasters of market 
conditions in the future and in this way will aid in 
allocating resources to the most valuable uses. For 
example, if in the future there will be an increase 
in demand that will lead to a price increase, then 
speculators who buy derivatives contracts now will 
bid up their prices in anticipation of that demand 
increase. Producers in turn will use these derivatives 
prices in making their production decisions and will 
increase their planned production in response to 
1  There is equally a clear consensus that derivatives contracts can be subject to abusive miss-selling. This is the basis for a number of legal protections which prevent 
their use by retail investors unless they demonstrate knowledge of the risks involved and the ﬁ  nancial capacity to deal with those risks. 
2  For a fuller discussion, see, for example among many others, Anderson (R.W.) and Danthine (J.-P.) (1983).
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higher derivatives prices. In this way production is 
guided to the markets where demand is greatest. 
On the cost side, speaking broadly, there is 
widespread recognition that derivative contracts 
can give rise to market manipulations, especially 
when the market environment is not sufﬁ  ciently 
transparent.3 Market squeezes occur when agents 
are able to exploit informational advantage on 
cash market by trading on the derivative market 
which because of anonymity will not fully reﬂ  ect 
the underlying cash market conditions as seen by 
informed agents. Corners occur when agents with 
established derivative positions may have incentive 
to distort the price in the underlying cash market 
temporarily. A tendency to manipulations of either 
sort damages the integrity of the market and can 
undermine the beneﬁ  ts of the market used for 
legitimate purposes. This assessment has given 
rise to a number of rules and laws aimed at making 
manipulations less likely to occur and punishing 
perpetrators when they occur. In some markets 
problems generated by a very non-transparent 
cash market have meant that risk of manipulations 
leads to shutting down derivatives trading. Usually, 
the market dies of natural causes as market 
participants simply turn away from the derivatives, 
but occasionally public authorities have assisted in 
bringing about their demise.4 
The view that derivatives contracts increase price 
volatility is closely related to the view that derivative 
contracts invite excessive speculation because of 
their relatively greater liquidity and high degree 
of leverage that can be achieved. Furthermore, 
derivatives are criticised from time to time because 
they facilitate short-selling. While there are many 
observers who have never wavered in their belief 
that derivatives cause instability there is no 
convincing evidence that this is generally the case. 
The academic literature on speculation has not 
given a deﬁ  nitive answer to the question of whether 
speculation stabilises or destabilises cash markets.5 
Empirically there is very little convincing evidence 
that derivatives trading increases price volatility 
as a general matter. It is true that volatility around 
contract settlement dates does seem to induce 
associated instability in cash markets. Furthermore, 
price changes on derivatives markets often seem 
to lead changes on spot markets. But this seems 
to be accounted for by the greater liquidity of 
derivatives. Finally, if the underlying cash market is 
an oligopoly, the introduction of derivatives trading 
might introduce greater competition and reduce 
price stickiness.6 
 
It is signiﬁ   cant that both the potential social 
beneﬁ  ts of derivatives and possibly their social 
costs depend largely on their liquidity. More liquid 
markets facilitate risk sharing and price discovery. 
But liquidity is an aid to speculation as well. If 
speculation is excessive, one might think that 
reducing liquidity would be a good thing. 
The reason derivatives markets are often more liquid 
than the underlying cash markets is the fact that 
they are relatively standardised. If a contract design 
can be found that serves a wide range of users, then 
more agents will be on the market thus providing 
the important liquidity attributes of tightness (low 
bid/ask spreads), depth (ability to trade large 
quantities without having much price impact) and 
resilience (speed with which the market absorbs 
a large trade). In the case of exchange traded 
contracts, standardisation is achieved through the 
contract terms established by the exchange. In 
the case of over-the-counter (OTC) markets there 
are typically market standards established by 
professional organisations such as the International 
Swap Dealers Association (ISDA). For many 
derivatives users there is a trade-off between 
standardisation and having a closer link to the speciﬁ  c 
segment of the cash market where the participant is 
active. When the derivative is too distant from the 
agent’s cash market then there will be a poor 
correlation between the derivative and cash market. 
The resulting “basis risk” will undermine the use of 
the derivative for hedging purposes.7 The difﬁ  culty 
of anticipating which contracts will attract a critical 
mass of participants means that exchanges regularly 
3  For the pioneering analysis of derivatives manipulations based on asymmetric information see, Kyle (A.) (1984). 
4  Curbing manipulations was the main regulatory intent of the Commodity Exchange Act 1936 which is still the foundation of derivatives regulation in the United States. 
See Anderson (R.W.) (1984).
5  Conditions under which speculation on futures markets can stabilise cash markets are given in Danthine (J.-P.) (1978). Conditions when the opposite holds are given 
in Guesnerie (R.) and Rochet (J.-C.) (1993).
6  Slade (M.) (1991).
7  For an analysis of this issue see, Dufﬁ  e (D.) and Jackson (M.O.) (1989).
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introduce new derivative contracts which ultimately 
fail. The greater ﬂ  exibility of OTC contracts (as well 
as the development of electronic trading platforms) 
has been the basis of the boom of those markets 
relative to traditional exchange trade instruments 
since the mid-1990s.8
The other key feature of derivatives is the ability 
to achieve a high degree of leverage. This is 
a consequence of the fact that since derivatives 
contracts set out the price and other terms for 
transactions taking place in the future, they can be 
priced so as to require no initial transfer of cash 
between buyers and sellers. Subsequently, when 
underlying cash market prices and other conditions 
(such as volatility) change the value of the already 
established derivative contract will change leaving 
the buyer either with a gain or loss (and the seller 
with the compensating loss or gain). Thus in 
principle, the degree of risk that can be taken on 
in a derivative contract relative to initial outlay 
can be inﬁ  nite. In practice, this is bounded by the 
amounts of security that are typically required 
(e.g., in the form of posted margins) in order to 
control counterparty risk, i.e., the risk that the 
party faced with an unrealised loss will default 
on contractual commitments. However, often the 
amounts of capital needed support a derivative trade 
will be relatively low either because the agent is 
considered a good credit risk or because margins are 
marked-to-market as prices evolve. 
How do these observations about derivatives in 
general apply to CDS markets? The answer will 
depend to a great extent upon the nature of the 
underlying credit risk that is being exchanged in the 
swap contract. In our discussion we will focus on 
(a) single name corporate CDSs, (b) index products, 
(c) sovereign CDSs and (d) CDSs based on structured 
credit products. We start with single-name corporate CDSs 
because they are relatively simple contracts, are 
very widely used, and illustrate many of the basic 
characteristics shared with CDSs on other forms 
of credit.
3| SINGLE NAME CORPORATE CDSS
The default swap market grew up in the 1990s in 
response to the need of banks and other lenders to 
hedge the risk that corporate clients might default 
on their loan or bond obligations. In the swap 
the credit protection buyer (say, bank A) pays 
the credit protection seller (say, hedge fund B) 
a periodic price of protection against default on 
a particular corporation (say, corporation C). The 
periodic payment is expressed as a contract coupon, 
called the spread, times the notional amount of the 
contract. If C defaults prior to the maturity of the 
swap, A delivers to B any note from a list of eligible 
notes issued by C, and in return B pays A par. Thus, 
upon default the credit protection buyer receives 
a net value equal to par minus the recovery value 
of the security. That is, it receives the loss given 
default (LGD).
This is a relatively simple security. Its cash ﬂ  ows 
strongly resemble those of an insurance policy taken 
out against the risk of default of corporation C. The 
spread times the notional amount is analogous to 
an insurance premium and the net value received 
by the protection buyer resembles the payment 
of an insurance claim. It is important however to 
recognise that the CDS is a derivative contract and 
not an insurance contract. In particular, unlike an 
insurance contract there is no obligation that the 
credit protection buyer has an “insured interest”. 
This makes CDSs attractive to a wide variety of 
users who wish to exchange risks associated with 
a possible default of a particular corporation. 
It may be that the protection buyer already possesses 
a note that is deliverable on the contract and wants 
to lay off that risk. But it may be that the protection 
buyer is exposed to risk of default in another way 
and wants to lay off that risk, perhaps imperfectly, 
in buying a CDS. For example, the protection buyer 
may own a non-deliverable note on the same name. 
Or it may be a bank with a loan outstanding to that 
name. Or it may have guaranteed loans. Or it may 
8  See, Anderson (R.W.) and McKay (K.) (2008).
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be long shares in the underlying company. Or it 
may own the obligations issued by a subsidiary of 
the underlying name. Normally, any of these agents 
would stand to lose money in the event of default 
of the underlying name. They may ﬁ  nd buying CDS 
protection is a relatively cost effective way to hedge 
their risk even if the protection obtained is not perfect. 
They may be willing to take on basis risk in return 
for gaining the advantages of CDS contract. As with 
other derivatives, those advantages are liquidity and 
competition among sellers, both of which contribute 
to making CDS markets relatively cheap.
The fact that CDSs on corporate debt could be 
attractive to a variety of agents formed the basis 
of the development of a liquid market. However, 
at its inception CDS trading developed as an OTC 
contract that was a relatively natural outgrowth of 
existing swap contracts. The main innovation was 
to make the exchange of notes at par contingent on 
a “credit event.” It took some time to settle on an 
acceptable deﬁ  nition of what constituted a credit 
event. The market only took off when standards 
for this and other CDS terms were agreed among 
market participants. These standards were codiﬁ  ed 
in the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Deﬁ  nitions 
which established credit events as (a) bankruptcy, 
(b) failure to pay on one or more obligations following 
any applicable grace period, (c) restructuring of any 
of a number of contract terms (e.g., reduction of 
interest or principal, postponement of payment, 
contractual subordination), (d) moratorium, and 
(e) payment acceleration on obligations due to 
violation of restrictive covenants. Once genuine 
liquidity arrived on the market between 2001 and 
2003, CDS contracts transformed the practice of 
credit risk management profoundly. The number 
of names for which it was possible to obtain ﬁ  rm 
dealer quotes to buy or sell CDS contracts with 1, 3 
and 5 years maturity grew enormously. This made 
it feasible to employ dynamic hedging strategies. 
Also, the quoted CDS spread became the standard 
pricing reference. This was used in monitoring 
credit risk exposures and in loan pricing. Arguably, 
the decline in the credit spreads through the end of 
2006 at least partially reﬂ  ected structural beneﬁ  ts 
from the development of a more liquid, competitive 
market for credit. 
It is worth emphasising that, by their nature, single 
name corporate CDS contracts are based on a 
relatively transparent underlying market. Companies 
issuing traded notes are almost always listed 
corporations required to ﬁ  le audited ﬁ  nancial reports 
and to meet listing standards. Often they are followed 
by security analysts. Typically, they are covered by 
rating agencies as well. Furthermore, agents with 
privileged information are prevented from exploiting 
this advantage by insider trading laws. 
All of these factors tend to reduce the chance of 
market manipulations. However, early experience 
with CDS contracts following credit events showed 
that the standard physical delivery settlement 
procedure could give rise to short squeezes. This 
arose because of the often fragmented, illiquid nature 
of the underlying cash market for notes and bonds. 
In particular, in case of default a credit protection 
buyer who did not already possess a deliverable 
note would need to buy one on the cash market. 
If few such notes were available for sale because 
most were in the hands of long-term investors, then 
the price could easily rise thus eliminating much 
of the effective credit protection that had been 
sought in buying the CDSs. As in other physical 
delivery derivatives contracts a partial remedy to 
this problem was to increase the deliverable supply 
by expanding the list of acceptable notes. Again as 
in the case of other physical delivery derivative 
contracts, this created a delivery option in this case 
accruing to the credit protection buyer. Uncertainty 
about which security would be cheapest to deliver 
in case of default created an added difﬁ  culty in 
valuation and tended to contribute to basis risk for 
participants. More recently, market participants 
have agreed an auction procedure that allows for 
the cash settlement of most contracts, while still 
allowing for physical settlement when mutually 
agreed by buyers and sellers. This seems to have 
signiﬁ  cantly reduced the susceptibility of CDSs to 
short squeeze problems. 
Another problem that has come to light in the 
CDS market, although it applies to interest rate 
swaps and other OTC derivatives as well, is that 
over time through the dynamics of trading derivative 
positions are added which are aimed at offsetting 
the economic effect of an earlier trade but leave the 
agent with two contracts. Both involve counterparty 
risk, and if they do not have exactly matching terms, 
then periodic cash ﬂ  ows will not be exactly offsetting. 
The latter problem has been dealt with through 
the introduction in 2009 of a market convention 
to always use standard contractual coupons 
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(e.g., 100 basis points – bps – or 500 bps in North America) 
and standard dates (the 20th of March, June, 
September and December). The accumulation of 
counterparty risk can be avoided if initial contracts 
are cancelled rather than offset with a new contract. 
There have been industry efforts to increase the use 
of contract cancellation in bilateral OTC contracts, 
and this has been facilitated by the increasing 
standardisation of contract terms. 
There is a widespread recognition that the counterparty 
risk in OTC derivatives is potentially a major problem 
and that industry efforts to reduce it in the context 
of bilateral settlement are not likely to deal with the 
problem satisfactorily. This is the basis of the current 
major push to establish multilateral settlement through 
central counterparties (CCPs) as the industry norm 
for most CDS contracts. This is the agreed intent of 
the major market participants, and it is likely to be 
backed by force of law through new legislation in 
Europe and the United States. While the operating 
details (and costs) differ across CCPs the principles 
are by now widely understood. When a swap trade is 
agreed between a buyer and seller, it is then cleared 
through a CCP which becomes the counterparty to 
each leg of the trade. In the case of default by one side, 
e.g., the seller, the CCP absorbs the loss and continues 
to honor its obligations to the buyer. The CCP keeps the 
risk of any default at low levels through its system of 
margins. And the solvency of the CCP itself is assured 
by setting margins at adequate levels relative to the 
underlying risks.
It should be emphasised that a CCP is not the same 
thing as a derivatives exchange and that using 
CCPs is compatible with continuing to negotiate 
CDS contracts in a dealer based OTC market. It 
seems clear that if CCP clearing becomes the 
industry norm this could deal quite effectively with 
most problems of counterparty risk and that this 
would facilitate the smooth functioning of a liquid 
CDS market. 
There still remains strong current of opinion which 
advocates the further step of forcing CDS trading 
onto recognised derivatives exchanges. What are 
the arguments in favor such a requirement? One 
argument is that a dealer based CDS market is 
less efﬁ  cient than would be an exchange and that 
dealers derive oligopolistic proﬁ  ts that could be 
eliminated by competition on an exchange. While 
dealing with this argument would take us off our 
main subject, it is worth making two points. First, 
this is an argument that would seem to apply to 
OTC derivatives markets in general and to have nothing 
particularly to do with the speciﬁ  cs of CDS contracts. 
Second, the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of alternative forms of market organisation have 
been debated in the literature on ﬁ  nancial market 
microstructure without coming to any very settled 
prescription as to the best market form. 
What of the argument that is sometimes heard that 
CDS contracts make “shorting” credit too cheap? 
This lies behind the call for banning “ naked shorts,” 
that is buying CDS protection when the agent does 
not own the underlying credit. First, it should be 
noted that the matter of whether buying CDS credit 
protection is cheap or dear is determined in the 
market. For  example, at the time of this writing the 
price of buying CDS protection on an investment 
grade name is on average 120 bps. Thus, if one 
assumes a recovery rate of 40% which is a fairly 
standard assumption for corporate bonds, for 
USD 120,000 per year one can buy the chance 
of receiving USD 6 million on a face value of 
USD 10 million. Is that cheap or dear? If one were to 
assume the one year probability of default is 0.163% 
which coincides with the historical average over 
1970-2008 for corporate bonds rated Baa by Moody’s, 
this translates into an expected payment of USD 9,780 
far less than the direct cost of protection. In fact, the 
probability of default implied by the current price is 
approximately 2%, that is, higher than the historical 
average by a factor of 12. Presumably many agents 
might not consider this very cheap. In fact, similar, 
but much more reﬁ  ned, calculations along these 
lines have led many economists to conclude that it 
is a puzzle that cost of credit protection in CDS is so 
high on average.9 
A second observation is that the idea that CDS 
makes short selling cheap is a repeat of the oft heard 
complaint levelled against derivatives in general. 
There is nothing particular about CDS that makes 
the argument either more or less compelling than 
for derivatives in general. The fact that the argument 
has not held sway in derivative markets generally, 
suggests that unless some further evidence comes 
forward there is a presumption that this does not 
9  Saita (L.) (2006).
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constitute a basis for shutting down these types of 
trades. Finally, it should be noted that a practical 
matter an effective ban on naked shorts would in all 
likelihood eliminate the attractiveness of the market 
for the whole range of cross hedging purposes where 
establishing that protection buyers have a material 
hedging interest would signiﬁ  cantly increase the 
costs of transacting. The resulting loss of liquidity 
would in turn increase the costs of hedging, both 
in terms of bid/ask spread and in terms of average 
risk premium, even for agents holding the speciﬁ  c 
claims underlying the CDS. 
Finally, it has sometimes been argued that single 
name CDS contracts may have an adverse effect 
on lenders. A mild version of this criticism is that 
if a bank hedges the risk on a loan granted to a 
corporation, then it will no longer have the incentive 
to monitor the ﬁ  rm after the loan is made nor to 
maintain high underwriting standards. On strictly 
theoretical grounds, this criticism may have some 
merit. Banks may be particularly eager to hedge 
credit risk on a name when the ﬁ  nancial condition 
of the ﬁ  rm is poor. Sellers of credit protection will 
take into account this possible private information 
and will command a higher spread as a result. 
The equilibrium that emerges in the face of such 
private information may be better or worse with 
CDS trading than without.10 However, when there 
is an established banking relationship, reputational 
considerations serve to mitigate problems of 
inefﬁ  cient monitoring.11 Thus there is no general 
result that would distinguish clearly between good 
and bad forms of risk transfer by banks which 
monitor borrowers. 
A more extreme version of this criticism is that the 
bank which purchased CDS protection on a ﬁ  rm 
may have the incentive to withdraw credit the ﬁ  rm 
and thus provoke a default by a distressed ﬁ  rm. 
Behavior of this sort may well be found to be illegal. 
The applicable laws vary across jurisdictions. For 
example, in English Common Law countries, if a 
bank were judged to induce the bankruptcy of a 
ﬁ  rm because it stood to gain on the CDS contracts 
this could be deemed a violation of the loan 
agreement depending upon speciﬁ  c terms set out in 
the contract. 
4| CDS CONTRACTS ON INDICES 
As the market for single name CDS contracts 
developed, it became obvious that such contracts 
had one major drawback for a bank or other ﬁ  nancial 
institution managing a portfolio of credit risks. 
To reduce overall exposure to systematic sources of 
credit risk it was necessary to buy a portfolio of single 
name CDS contracts. This involved considerable time 
and transactions costs. Furthermore, if single name 
CDS spreads priced both systematic and idiosyncratic 
risks, this strategy would be costly in that it did not 
take into consideration any of the gains from 
diversiﬁ  cation. The response to these problems was 
to develop CDS contracts based on indices, somewhat 
analogously to derivatives on stock indices that have 
been popular since the early 1980’s. 
CDS contracts on credit indices have been 
successfully introduced for North American 
credits (CBX contracts) and European credits 
(iTraxx contracts). There are a wide variety of 
contracts that have been developed differing with 
respect to the speciﬁ  c index that is used. However, 
they all follow the same basic template. A given 
CDS contract is based on a speciﬁ  c portfolio of 
credits and calling for protection over a given time 
horizon at initiation, 5-years being the most popular. 
At its inception the new contract becomes the 
“on-the-run” contract in a series of similar contracts. 
The contract is “rolled” from time to time, with the 
initiation of a new on-the-run contract based on 
a new portfolio of credits but designed to capture 
the same segment of the credit risk market as others 
in the same series (e.g., North American, investment 
grade, senior credits). The older contracts in the 
series are “off-the-run” contracts.
The spread on an index CDS is set in the market 
by supply and demand in a manner similar to 
single-name CDS. CDS calls for a payment of 
a contract coupon periodically by the credit 
protection buyer. At the time of purchase the credit 
protection buyer pays to or receives from the seller 
an up-front payment depending upon whether 
the market spread is above or below the contract 
rate. Later if the market spread has risen the credit 
10  Morrison (A) (2005) ; Chiesa (G.) (2008).
11  Parlour (C.) and Winton (A.) (2008). 
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protection buyer is in the money on the contract and 
can monetise this gain, e.g., by making an offsetting 
trade. The contract is based on notional amount that 
is ﬁ  xed in the initial contract but which is reduced 
subsequently as credit events on the underlying 
portfolio occur. For example, suppose the initial 
contract is for a notional of USD 50 million and is 
composed of 100 names. The protection buyer pays 
the contract spread on USD 50 million so long as 
no credit event has occurred. If one of underlying 
names incurs a credit event, then the protection 
buyer delivers a note on that name in the amount 
of USD 500,000 (=notional/number of credits) for 
which it receives par. Subsequently, the notional on 
the contract has been reduced to USD 49.5 million 
and involves 99 names. The protection buyer now 
pays a reduced amount for the credit protection 
because the notional amount of the contract has 
been reduced. Upon the next credit event the 
process is repeated and the notional is reduced by 
1/99, and so on until all names default or, as is more 
likely, the expiry of the contract. 
It should be noted that the market spread on an 
index CDS is not the same as the theoretical value 
of the index of the underlying CDS spreads. The 
basis of the index CDS equals its market quoted 
spread minus the underlying theoretical value.12 
In principle, arbitrage should assure a tight relation 
between the market spread and its corresponding 
theoretical value. However, in practice transactions 
costs and market thinness can result in substantial 
ﬂ  uctuations of the basis.
One of the main beneﬁ   ts of index CDSs over 
single name CDSs is that they are attractive to a 
wider range of potential participants than those 
seeking to exchange risks on a single name. This 
tends to promote their greater liquidity. This in 
turn enhances their attractiveness for the purposes 
of risk shifting and price discovery. The greater 
liquidity of index CDSs is reﬂ  ected in the fact that 
the market spread of an index product often leads 
its theoretical value. Furthermore, by design index 
CDSs are aimed at transferring systematic risk that 
lenders cannot otherwise control through screening 
or monitoring. This tends to improve the efﬁ  ciency 
of intermediation.13 
Another advantage of index CDSs is that they are 
less prone to problems of manipulations. As with 
single-name contracts, they are based on listed names 
about which considerable information circulates in 
ﬁ  nancial markets. However, unlike single-name CDSs, 
since they are based on a broad portfolio, there 
is relatively little incentive to attempt to exploit 
informational advantage that an agent may have on 
some narrow segment of the credit market. Furthermore, 
by the nature of the way credit events are treated in 
index CDSs, any improvements in the underlying single 
name CDSs that come from the introduction of auction 
settlement also aid in reducing possible manipulation 
problems for index CDSs. 
If there is a signiﬁ  cant problem with index CDS, 
it is basis risk. The constituent portfolio may differ 
signiﬁ  cantly from a given hedger’s own portfolio. 
Furthermore, as already discussed, the market 
spread of an index CDS can diverge at times from 
its own theoretical value. This was experienced by 
a number of banks during the crisis of 2007-2008 
when the quality of their index hedges was found to 
deteriorate. However, it should be noted that basis 
risk is a cost of using index CDS that should be fully 
internalised by private agents when making their 
decision to use such contract. 
5| SOVEREIGN CDSS
Formally, there is little difference between a single 
name corporate CDS and a CDS contract based 
on obligations issued by a sovereign entity. Since 
sovereign entities are not covered by bankruptcy 
laws applicable to corporations, bankruptcy is not 
credit event for sovereigns. However, the other 
forms of credit events including failure to pay or 
restructuring do apply to sovereign CDSs. Quotation 
and settlement procedures of single name corporate 
CDSs are applicable to sovereigns as well. 
Sovereign debt is traded actively on global ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The information that is available to 
participants in the sovereign CDS market will differ 
from case to case depending upon the sovereign 
entity in questions. Generally, one can expect the 
12  Note that “basis” is a context speciﬁ  c notion. The basis referred to here is not to be confused with the difference between the on-the-run spread and an off-the-run 
spread nor with the difference between an index CDS spread and a theoretical spread based on a hedger’s own portfolio of credits. Traders refer to “my basis” as the 
price difference that they are following. 
13  See Chiesa (G.) (2008).
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sovereign market be larger and more liquid than 
the corporate bond market (if it exists) for ﬁ  rms 
in that country. The larger the country and the 
more transparent and reliable the reporting on 
its ﬁ  scal condition we can expect a more liquid 
market. Of course, if the prospect of sovereign 
default is extremely remote there will be very little 
hedging demand and the market may be inactive. 
However, for active sovereign markets, liquidity and 
transparency are sufﬁ  cient to mean that problems of 
short squeezes would not be a particular impediment 
to CDS trading. 
All these observations suggest that when underlying 
sovereign debt is traded actively, a liquid CDS market 
can emerge which would serve the purposes of risk 
shifting and price discovery. If so over time it can 
be expected to help lower the costs of sovereign 
borrowing.
Despite these observations, sovereign CDS trading 
has attracted a number of vocal and inﬂ  uential 
critics, precisely because of its potential liquidity. 
The particular complaint is that it leaves sovereign 
borrowers open to speculative attacks because it 
facilitates short-selling through the purchase of 
credit protection in a CDS. How would such an attack 
work? This has been described in many models of 
ﬁ  nancial crises. A basic scenario is as follows. 
A government faced with a high current ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit, engages in a borrowing program by making a 
promise to reduce deﬁ  cits in the future. In projecting 
these deﬁ  cits it makes assumptions about growth of 
tax revenues and of the costs of borrowing. These two 
are interdependent. If the market believes the deﬁ  cit 
projection, the borrowing costs will be moderate 
and the plan would be feasible. However, if the 
market does not believe the tax revenue projections, 
then the borrowing costs will be higher than 
projected, the deﬁ  cit plan will be infeasible and the 
government will be forced to default or restructure 
its debt. Thus a crisis may arise in equilibrium as a 
self-fulﬁ  lling prophecy. As described there may be 
multiple equilibria. Recent models of crises based 
on global games show conditions on the information 
structure such that crises may emerge as a unique 
equilibrium.14
 
Now large sovereign defaults have occurred in the 
absence of active CDS trading. Both the Russian default 
of 1998 and the Argentine default of 2001 involved 
elements of a speculative attack – international 
investors abandoned the markets forcing a sharp 
increase in yields making it increasingly difﬁ  culty 
to roll-over maturing debt – but did not involve 
CDS trading in any major way. So if sovereign debt 
crises can arise in the absence of CDS trading, why 
is sovereign CDS trading itself so suspect? 
The answer seems to be that it contributes to the 
liquidity of the market for sovereign debt and that is 
undesirable in itself. That is, they grease the wheels 
of capital ﬂ  ows when in fact it would be desirable to 
throw some grit into those wheels instead. Whether 
capital mobility is a good or bad thing is a broader 
question about which we have nothing to say 
here. However, it seems that sovereign borrowers 
welcome liquidity when it lowers their borrowing 
costs as was the case with a number of countries that 
have joined the Euro zone. To oppose liquidity in 
some markets and encourage it in others does seem 
rather inconsistent and self-defeating. 
Another possible fear, which again just repeats 
a fear often expressed about derivatives generally, 
is that CDS trading may be so large as to swamp 
the underlying sovereign bond market and that this 
would somehow provoke a sovereign default. This 
argument has problems on several grounds. First, as 
has been pointed out recently in the context of the 
problems on Euro zone debt, it is not factually correct. 
The sovereign CDS market has been relatively small 
compared to the underlying debt markets.15 Second, 
if the CDS market were to grow under pressure from 
speculators seeking to buy credit protection (naked 
shorts) they would have to be met by sellers of credit 
protection. Who would all those sellers be? It is likely 
that the CDS spread would rise and that the naked 
shorts would be forced to pay dear for their bets. 
(See the calculation for single name corporate CDSs 
above). Finally, if CDS open interest were very large 
compared to the underlying cash market, in the 
event of default, the settlement process (whether 
based on auction or otherwise) would force the 
CDS longs to buy the underlying cash instruments. 
This would bid their price up and would reduce the 
14  See Morris (S.) and Shin (H.-S.) (1998).
15 See  Dufﬁ  e (D.) (2010).
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net payments protection buyers receive. Thus there 
are clear market forces that would tend to keep the 
scale of CDS trading in reasonable proportion to the 
size of the underlying sovereign debt market. 
Finally, would it be possible that a sovereign 
CDS conveys information that would lead to crisis? 
For example, could a rising CDS spread itself attract 
attention to the ﬁ  scal difﬁ  culties of a sovereign 
borrow and in this way raise borrowing costs? 
This argument does not seem very strong. As has 
been emphasised in the global games analyses of 
crises, the key ingredient to a give rise to crises is 
a degree of imperfect information among market 
participants about the underlying fundamentals 
of the market.16 It is hard to see how the presence 
of CDS trading or its absence greatly affects the 
availability of information about the future ﬁ  scal 
health of a sovereign borrower. The key to seeing off 
an unwarranted speculative attack in a sovereign 
debt market is for the public authorities to provide 
information about a credible ﬁ  scal plan. 
6| CDSS ON STRUCTURED 
PRODUCTS
Structured credit products such as collateralised 
debt obligations (CDOs) and collateralised loan 
obligations (CLOs) emerged in the 1980’s borrowing 
techniques developed earlier in the securitisation 
of mortgage pools. From those beginnings the 
market grew strongly and a wide variety of different 
structures were introduced, the details of which 
were only really understood by a fairly narrow 
group of specialists. Later, after the introduction of 
CDS trading, it became fairly natural to begin to write 
CDS protection on securitisations. After all, a tranche 
of a securitisation is a ﬁ  xed income instrument 
that is equivalent to a corporate bond in the sense 
that it pays coupon interest until maturity or until 
default occurs. The innovation proved successful 
and CDSs on securitisations were actively traded at 
least until the whole securitisation market collapsed 
in the crisis of 2007-2008. The fact that CDSs became 
linked to CDOs in people’s minds probably explains 
why the CDS market earned the reputation for being 
complex; whereas, as we have seen, in its basic 
mechanics a CDS is rather simple. Indeed, CDSs 
often did play a role in resecuritisations, the so-
called CDOs-squared, which came to epitomise the 
process of ﬁ  nancial innovation run-amok.
A CDS contract on a securitised tranche is not 
inherently different from a CDS on an index of 
corporate names. There is an underlying reference 
portfolio of credits and the contracts calls for the 
credit protection buyer to pay coupon interest on 
the notional amount outstanding. The notional 
amount outstanding is reduced by credit events 
in the manner described above for index CDSs. 
The difference, however, is that the reduction of 
notional is applied only for certain range of losses. 
For example, a CDS on a mezzanine tranche of 
a structure may have a lower attachment point at 5% 
and an upper attachment point at 10% of losses. As 
losses on the underlying portfolio occurred affecting 
0 to 5% of the credit, there would be no change of the 
notional on the CDSs. As losses would arise above 
the 5% threshold, the CDS protection buyer would 
be compensated for losses. The notional amount of 
the CDSs would be reduced until the threshold of 
10% losses is reached at which point the CDS expires.
The complexity of a CDS on a tranche derives 
from the complexity and lack of transparency 
of the underlying structure. The securitisation 
process has always been a ratings based business, 
and this feature of the market was reinforced 
with the Basel II standards which gave credit 
ratings agencies (CRAs) a critical role in setting 
regulatory capital requirements. Ratings are meant 
to aggregate underlying information, and by their 
nature they transform information sensitive assets 
into information insensitive assets. The latter 
are attractive to investors precisely because they 
feel that they do not need to actively monitor the 
assets. In the fall-out of the crisis of 2007-2008, 
16  As phrased in Hyun Shin’s summary of Morris and Shin 1998, “Information plays a very subtle role in speculative crises. What is important in staving off currency 
attacks is not the amount of information made available to the market, per se, but rather how public and transparent this information is. If market participants 
are well informed about the fundamentals, but they are unsure of the information received by other participants, and hence unsure of the beliefs held by others, 
speculative attacks may be triggered even though everyone knows that the fundamentals are sound. Our analysis highlights the importance of the transparency of 
the conduct of monetary policy and its dissemination to the public. If it is the case that the onset of currency crises may be precipitated by higher order beliefs, even 
though participants believe that the fundamentals are sound, then the policy instruments which will stabilize the market are those which aim to restore transparency 
to the situation, in an attempt to restore common knowledge of the fundamentals.” 
  http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Shin/curr_abs.html 
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it became apparent that many securitisations were 
bought simply on the basis of their rating and that 
investors did not, and in most cases, could not learn 
much about the risk characteristics of the asset pool 
underlying the structure. 
Thus unlike single name or index CDS based on 
underlying corporate borrowers, CDS contracts on 
securitisations were based on an opaque underlying 
cash instrument. This would seem to be a major 
impediment to the trading such instruments. 
Despite this fact, CDSs for securitisations developed 
on a large scale over time. Why? The answer is 
that they served a very useful function in the 
securitisation. Speciﬁ   cally, CDS could be used 
as a credit enhancement that would allow the 
super-senior tranche of a securitisation or 
resecuritisation to achieve the coveted triple-A rating. 
The sellers of CDS protection were often monoline 
insurers who would sometimes use such contracts as 
an alternative to the ﬁ  nancial loss insurance policies 
that had long-been used as a credit enhancement in 
securitisations. 
The advantage of monolines over other writers 
of CDS protection was that because of their 
triple-A rating they were able to command high 
spreads. We now see that this commercial advantage 
meant that until late 2006 they built up large positions 
in the fast growing ABS segments including those 
based on subprime mortgages. The fact that these 
contracts represented a very large implied exposure 
to the general level of the US property market went 
largely unnoticed until difﬁ  culties in that market 
emerged in mid-2007. It now seems clear that the 
lack of transparency of the underlying asset markets 
and the complexity of the structure in which CDSs 
were just one component part contributed to the 
failure of the market participants to understand the 
nature of the economic risks they had taken on. 
Now even sophisticated investors have largely lost 
their appetite for the risks of complex ﬁ  nancial 
structures. The securitisation industry has been greatly 
reduced as a result. It may take a long time before 
the market strengthens. If and when it does, probably 
investors will be wiser in their risk assessments. They 
will probably demand better information about risks 
and greater returns for bearing them. However, the 
experience of securitisations has proved to be an 
object lesson in the limits of caveat emptor in the face 
of ﬁ  nancial innovation. This has led some to call for 
a more active public regulation of such innovations. 
There is some precedence for such regulations. The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission has long had 
responsibility for vetting new products proposed for 
trading on derivatives exchanges in the United States. 
In retrospect, it does appear that the balance of 
beneﬁ  ts in risk sharing and price discovery provided 
by tranche CDSs versus their costs quite likely were 
negative. Whether or not a regulator would have 
been able to assess this clearly ex ante may be open 
to debate. However, if, in the future, innovation in 
CDS trading is brought under regulatory oversight, the 
analysis that we have provided gives some guidance 
on how it should be done. The primary question to be 
answered by all concerned is whether the underlying 
cash market is sufﬁ  ciently transparent so as to allow 
risks to be assessed by both buyers and seller of credit 
protection on these instruments. 
7| CAN CDS MARKETS PROVIDE
  INFORMATION TO GUIDE
  PUBLIC POLICY?
We have argued that like other derivatives CDS contracts 
serve a social purpose as an aggregator of information 
of diverse market participants. In this price discovery 
role they can help to guide resources toward 
investments that are best on a risk adjusted basis. 
This informational function is carried out naturally 
in the private market without the direct involvement 
of any public sector agent. Now the question arises 
whether in addition to this function, CDS contracts 
can be of more direct use to public authorities. In 
particular, can CDS contracts convey information 
to regulators that they would not otherwise have and 
thereby help them to better implement policy?
In particular, there have been several proposals to 
use CDSs spreads in developing new tools for macro-
prudential regulation. Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales 
have argued that CDS contracts written on banks 
could be used to monitor their solvency. An increase 
in the CDS spread would be a signal of a worsening 
in the ﬁ   nancial position of the bank and thus 
might serve as a trigger for some form of corrective 
action. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu have developed a 
proposal for a regulatory capital surcharge that 
could be assessed on systemically important banks 
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that would incorporate information from the CDS 
market.17 In particular, their capital charge would be 
implemented using the large banks’ CDS spreads to 
identify their probability of default (PD) and high-
frequency equity information would be used to 
estimate asset return correlations.
There are important reasons why such proposals 
may be misguided or at least premature, pending 
a better understanding of the behavior of pricing 
on the CDS market. In particular, CDS spreads 
cannot be taken in any direct manner as 
a proxy for the true probability of default of the 
name underlying the contract. Like prices of 
any ﬁ  nancial asset, the market price of a CDS is 
based on the risk neutralised distribution of the 
underlying risk. At any given time, the CDS spread 
quoted on the market will be a composite of 
(1) the market’s assessment of the physical 
default distribution (PD, LGD), (2) a risk premium 
reﬂ   ecting the market price of default risk, 
(3) a bid/ask spread reﬂ  ecting liquidity on the 
CDS market, (4) a discount reﬂ  ecting the value of 
the delivery option on the CDS, and (5) a discount 
for the counterparty risk in the CDS. Thus changes 
over time observed in CDS spreads could reﬂ  ect 
changes in any of these ﬁ  ve factors. It would be 
an error to assume that factors (2)–(5) are constant 
and infer from an increase in spreads that the 
underlying name’s probability of default necessarily 
had gone up. 
In a recent study I have tried to see what are the 
dominant factors accounting for changes in spreads 
over time.18 I estimate the risk neutral distribution of 
defaults using time series data on CDS spreads. I use 
estimates of the physical default distribution derived 
from default histories. Combining the two I identify 
the implied distribution of the market price of default 
risk. I ﬁ  nd the volatility of the price of default risk 
dominates that of the physical default intensity by 
a factor of about 10. Thus changes in the CDS are more 
likely to reﬂ  ect changes in the market’s willingness 
to bear default risk on the name rather than changes 
in the solvency of that name. This suggests that 
the reliance upon CDS spreads for the purposes of 
macro-prudential regulation as in Huang et al. (2009) 
or as proposed by Hart and Zingales is likely to be 
misguided unless there is an adequate control for 
changes in spreads attributable purely to changes 
in the markets' pricing of credit risk.
This is not to say that public authorities should 
ignore CDS spreads. On the contrary, they 
probably should be monitoring spreads on banks 
as a supplement to their own information on bank 
solvency obtained through their normal surveillance 
activities. However, there is no reason at all to relax 
those surveillance activities because a CDS market 
exists. Indeed, in light of the recent crisis, it would 
seem important now more than ever that regulators 
reinforce the access to information and that they 
lead, rather than follow, the market. 
17  Huang (X.), Zhou (H.) and Zhu (H.) (2009).
18  See Anderson (R.) (2009).
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We have emphasised that the credit default swap is a ﬁ  nancial derivative contract similar to others that 
have long been an integral part of our ﬁ  nancial system. The innovation in CDS trading was to make 
a commitment about a future transaction contingent on an uncertain event, namely, the default by the 
underlying credit. Like other derivatives it can provide signiﬁ  cant social beneﬁ  ts in risk sharing and price 
discovery. However, these beneﬁ  ts can be undermined if the contract proves to be prone to manipulations 
or if it does not deal with counterparty risk adequately. In its ﬁ  rst 15 years of development largely as an 
OTC market, the CDS market has gone through a number of reﬁ  nements to deal with these potential 
problems. The risk of short squeezes appears to have been reduced signiﬁ  cantly with the organisation of 
auctions for settlement following credit events. Standardisation of contract terms has facilitated contract 
cancellation which has helped to reduce problems of the accumulation of counterparty risks. The current 
push by industry and by regulators toward central counterparty clearing is likely to further reduce 
counterparty risks very considerably. 
On balance it seems that the CDS market for corporate issuers, either of the single-name variety or when 
based on indices, has been favorable for the efﬁ  ciency of credit markets. With their advent the business 
of credit risk management has been transformed to become much more market based. Lenders have 
a much better knowledge of the risks that they take on, and they have much greater scope for actively 
managing those risks. 
We have identiﬁ  ed two outstanding issues involving CDS contracts which are legitimately the subject 
of current policy debate. The ﬁ  rst is whether by facilitating the trading of default risks, CDSs may make 
a market prone to speculative attacks on the underlying credit. This is probably the only major doubt 
one can have about the market for sovereign CDSs which otherwise is likely to provide the same 
efﬁ  ciency beneﬁ  ts seen in trading corporate CDSs. We have argued that the heart of the problem of 
speculative attacks on sovereign borrowers is one of providing credible public information about the future 
solvency of the borrower. The presence or absence of CDS trading has little effect on this. The second 
outstanding policy issue is whether the market can be relied upon to foreclose the development of a 
CDS market when the underlying cash market is too opaque to permit the informed assessment of risks 
by buyers and sellers of credit protection. The example of CDS contracts on tranches of securitisations 
and the role played by such contracts in the ill-fated CDO-squared’s leaves one with reasonable 
doubts on the question. The CDS contracts themselves were fairly simple but for a time they played an 
important role in the construction of very complex structures which exacerbated the important defects of 
the securitisation market including the excess trust put in external ratings and in the lack of transparency 
about the assets pools. A degree of regulatory oversight on the introduction of new CDS products might 
be justiﬁ  ed to assure there is an adequate ﬂ  ow of information on underlying risks. 
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